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Abstract
This paper analyzes a suppliers incentives to foreclose downstream entry when
entrants have stronger positions in di¤erent market segments, thus bringing added
value as well as competition. We rst consider the case where wholesale contracts
take the form of linear tari¤s, and characterize the conditions under which the
competition-intensifying e¤ect dominates, thereby leading to foreclosure. We then
show that foreclosure can still occur with non-linear tari¤s, even coupled with
additional provisions such as resale price maintenance.
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1 Introduction
Many industries have seen the emergence of new distribution channels, such as mobile
virtual network operators (MVNOs) in the telecommunication industry, or platforms such
as Amazon.com or Alibaba.com in online retailing. These new channels often appeal to
di¤erent types of customers than existing channels. For example, MVNOs typically of-
fer cheaper no-frillsservices, targeting price-sensitive or younger customers. Similarly,
online platforms attract a broad audience whereas established brick-and-mortar stores
appeal more to consumers with high brand loyalty. A challenge for these entrants, how-
ever, is to get access to established suppliers. For example, MVNOs do not possess their
own networks and therefore need to secure access to incumbent mobile network opera-
tors (MNOs). Similarly, online platforms must convince consumer good manufacturers
to distribute their products through their channels.1
When deciding on whether to grant access to their products, or denying supply and
foreclosing the market, the incumbents face a trade-o¤. Entrants bring value by attracting
di¤erent types of consumers. In theory, the incumbents may benet from this added value
through appropriate wholesale arrangements. In practice, however, it may be di¢ cult
to limit entry to specic segments and, more generally, to control entrantsmarketing
strategies; they may then compete with the incumbents, thereby dissipating prot, and
may even end-up challenging incumbentscore business.
In this paper, we develop a simple framework to study this trade-o¤. Specically, we
consider a setting with one incumbent at both upstream and downstream levels, and
two market segments. The downstream incumbent has a strong position in the high-
end segment, and faces an entrant that brings value in the low-end segment. We rst
characterize the drivers of the incumbentsdecision to accommodate entry or foreclose
the market when contractual arrangements with the entrant are limited to simple lin-
ear wholesale tari¤s. We then show that general non-linear tari¤s even coupled with
additional vertical restraints such as resale price maintenance (RPM) do not always
su¢ ce to maximize industry prot or ensure entry accommodation. This is because, as
long as wholesale contracts cannot condition on the customer group to which the entrant
is allowed to sell, the entrant prefers to divert units from the low-end to the high-end
segment whenever the margins are larger there. As a result, foreclosure may occur.
The existing literature has considered the incentive of incumbent suppliers to dampen
downstream competition by raising rivalscosts in various circumstances. Ordover et al.
(1990), Chen (2001), and Sappington (2005) study the situation with a single incumbent
and demonstrate that if the stand-alone rm has an outside option or sells a di¤erentiated
good, foreclosure is only partial. Ordover and Sha¤er (2007), Hoe­ er and Schmidt (2008),
1In the telecommunication industry, MNOs foreclosed MVNOs in several countries (e.g., Spain or
Poland) without regulation of the market (see European Commission, 2006). Also, many established
apparel producers o¤er no or only a small selection of their products on Internet retailers.
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and Bourreau at al. (2011) allow for multiple suppliers and demonstrate that partial
foreclosure can also occur with competition in the upstream market. These papers focus
on linear wholesale tari¤s and therefore cannot answer the question why an incumbent still
prefers foreclosure if more elaborate contracts are feasible. The literature on non-linear
wholesale tari¤s (e.g., Hart and Tirole, 1990, OBrien and Sha¤er, 1992) demonstrates
that if the entrant o¤ers a di¤erentiated good, full exclusion is never optimal because
the non-linear tari¤ allows the supplier to extract the higher industry prots in a better
way.2 In contrast, we nd that when rms can target specic market segments, non-linear
tari¤s, even augmented with RPM, are not enough to guarantee entry.3
2 The Model
Initially, there are two incumbent rms, U and D. U costlessly supplies an input to D,
who transforms it into a nal good using a one-to-one technology. There is a unit mass
of consumers, with heterogeneous values and cost of service: a proportion x of consumers
have valuations VD and unit costs C, whereas the others have valuations vD and unit cost
c; the rst group of consumers constitutes the high-endmarket segment and are more
valuable:
VD   C > vD   c:
We will consider two scenarios, in which either the incumbents are vertically integrated,
or they can engage in e¢ cient contracting (e.g., two-part tari¤s); all results are valid in
both scenarios. Throughout the paper, the incumbentswill refer to the integrated rm
in the former scenario, and to the upstream supplier in the latter scenario.
A new rm E can enter the downstream market, with a comparative advantage in the
low-end segment: for the sake of exposition, we suppose that it faces the same costs as D
in each segment, C and c, but o¤er di¤erent values to consumers, VE and vE, satisfying:
vE > vD and VD > VE:
Downstream rms can discriminate consumers across the two segments: each rm
i = D;E sets two prices, Pi in the high-end and pi in the low-end segment.4 By contrast,
we assume that the supplier cannot discriminate the terms of the contract o¤ered to E
2See Rey and Tirole (2007) for a summary of foreclosure incentives with non-linear tari¤s.
3Gabrielsen and Johansen (2017) demonstrate that non-linear tari¤s and RPM are not su¢ cient to
maximize the industry prot if downstream rms must also make investment decisions. However, they
are not concerned with market foreclosure.
4For the sake of exposition, we focus here on third-degree price discrimination (which is here equiv-
alent to rst-degree price discrimination, due to consumer homogeneity within a segment). However, if
consumption patterns di¤er across segments (e.g., high-end consumers generate larger volumes), then
our insights extend to second-degree price discrimination i.e., when rms cannot distinguish between
consumers but can o¤er several types of contracts. See the Online Appendix for a formal analysis.
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according to targeted downstream segments that is, the tari¤ can only be based on the
quantity bought by E, but cannot be made contingent on which consumers the quantity
is sold to.5
The game consists of two stages: in the rst stage, U o¤ers a wholesale price wE to E
(and a two-part tari¤ (FD; wD) to D, if separated), which E (and D) can either accept
or reject. In the second stage, D and E compete in prices.
Absent entry, the industry maximizes its prot by setting PD = VD and pD = vD,
yielding a prot of
m  x (VD   C) + (1  x) (vD   c) :
We will assume that foreclosure is more protable than removing D from the market,
that is:
m > x (VE   C) + (1  x) (vE   c) : (1)
Throughout the paper, we assume that the incumbents accommodate entry whenever
they are indi¤erent between foreclosing it or not.
3 Equilibrium
The following proposition determines under which conditions foreclosure is optimal:
Proposition 1 The incumbents foreclose entry if and only if
x [(VE   C)  (vE   c)] > (1  x)(vE   vD): (2)
Proof. The incumbents can securem by chargingwE = +1 (and (FD = m; wD = 0),
under separation). Furthermore, in order for the incumbents to obtain more prot than
m, E must be serving the low-end segment, which requires wE  vE   c.
Thus, consider wE  vE c and a candidate equilibrium in which E serves the low-end
segment. If E supplies only the low-end segment, then the price at which D serves the
high-end segment must satisfy VD   PD  VE   (C + wE), as E will compete with D in
the high-end segment and is willing to set PE as low as C + wE; hence, the incumbents
cannot obtain more than
I = x(PD   C) + (1  x)wE  x(VD   VE) + wE:
5Assigning exclusive territorieswould be a simple way of preventing competition among downstream
rms, and would thus allow the incumbents to achieve industry prot maximization. However, such
vertical restraints are not always allowed (in Europe, for example, manufacturers are prevented from
restricting brick-and-mortar retailers to open online stores as well), and they may be di¢ cult to enforce.
In practice, U may be unable to identify Es customers, and even if such information was available, it
may not be veriable in courts.
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If instead E supplies both segments, then the incumbentsprot is equal to wE. It follows
that the maximal prot that the incumbents can obtain does not exceed:
x(VD   VE) + vE   c:
Comparing this expression with m shows that foreclosure occurs whenever (2) holds.
We now show that, conversely, entry occurs when (2) is not met. Suppose that U sets
wE = vE   c, inducing E to o¤er pE = vE in the low-end segment and PE = vE   c+ C
in the high-end segment. If vE   c > VE   C, then E cannot actively compete in the
high-end segment (as PE > VE) and D can thus charge PD = VD in that segment. The
incumbents (with wD = VD C, under separation)6 can then obtain the entire monopoly
prot, equal to
M = x (VD   C) + (1  x) (vE   c) > m:
If instead vE   c  VE   C, then D can serve the high-end segment at price PD =
C + VD   VE + vE   c. Under vertical integration, the incumbents thus obtain:
 = x(VD   VE) + vE   c;
which exceeds m if (2) does not hold. Under separation, charging wD = vD   c ensures
that D is not willing to serve the low-end segment but is willing to serve the high-end
segment at price PD, as the margin PD C = VD VE+vE c exceeds wD (using VD > VE
and vE > vD).
The intuition is as follows. Accommodating entry is protable only if E serves the
low-end segment, in which case U optimally charges wE = vE   c to extract Es prot
in that segment. If vE   c  VE   C, then E cannot compete in the high-end segment
(as wE +C exceeds VE), and the incumbents obtain the maximal industry prot; hence,
foreclosure does not occur in equilibrium. By contrast, if vE   c < VE   C, then E can
compete in the high-end segment as well, which reduces the prot that the incumbents
can achieve in that segment. Foreclosure is then optimal if this prot-dissipation e¤ect
(measured by the left-hand side of (2)) o¤-sets the added-value brought by E in the low-
end segment (measured by the right-hand side). As can be seen from (2), this is more
likely when the high-end segment is large (x high), E is relatively less competitive in the
low-end segment ((VE   C)   (vE   c) large), or adds little value to D in that segment
(vE   vD small).
When foreclosure occurs, mandating entry (e.g., by imposing a cap on the wholesale
price wE not exceeding vE   c) can only benet consumers,7 and increase social welfare.
6This in particular ensures that D is not willing to contest E in the low-end segment.
7Consumers benet from a lower price in the high-end market, and may obtain a greater value in the
low-end market if wE < vE   c.
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4 Di¤erent types of wholesale contracts
From the previous discussion, if vE c  VE C, then the incumbents obtain the maximal
industry prot. Otherwise, competition in the high-end segment prevents full industry
prot maximization, and leads to foreclosure if (2) holds. We now analyze whether these
insights carry over with more elaborate wholesale contracts.
We rst show that the use of more general tari¤s does not necessarily restore industry
prot maximization.
Proposition 2 If vE   c < VE   C, non-linear tari¤s do not allow the incumbents to
achieve industry prot maximization.
Proof. To maximize industry prot, D must serve the high-end consumers at price
VD and E must serve the low-end segment at price vE. However, E can then divert one
unit from the low-end to the high-end segment and sell it at price (slightly below) VE,
and has indeed the incentive to do so if VE   C > vE   c, a contradiction.
Proposition 2 shows that non-linear tari¤s alone do not su¢ ce to achieve joint prot-
maximization. The reason is that they cannot prevent E from diverting part of its sales
to the high-end segment, and E has indeed an incentive to do so whenever its margin
there is larger than the margin in the low-end segment. A common way to restrict
further the behavior of downstream rms is to control consumer prices, a practice known
as Resale Price Maintenance (RPM). In the spirit of the above analysis, we consider
here industry-wideRPM, where the price restrictions cannot be made contingent on
consumer segments. If both types of consumers wish to buy at the contracted price,
then the e¤ectiveness of such provisions depends on the extent to which rms have to
satisfy demand. We will consider two polar scenarios: in the rst one (no rationing),
rms cannot ration demand in any way; in the second scenario, rms can not only ration
demand, but moreover select which consumers to serve. The next proposition shows that
combining RPM with non-linear tari¤s enables industry prot maximization for a larger
range of situations, but not for all.
Proposition 3 Suppose that vE   c < VE  C and that non-linear contracts are allowed.
We then have:
(i) If C < c and VE > vE, then RPM cannot restore industry prot maximization,
regardless of whether rms can ration demand.
(ii) If instead VE  vE, then RPM restores industry prot maximization, even when
rms cannot ration demand.8
8In that case, simple linear tari¤s actually su¢ ce to achieve industry prot maximization.
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(iii) Finally, if VE > vE but C  c, then RPM restores industry prot maximization
when rms can select which buyers to serve.
Proof. (i) From the proof of Proposition 2, as vE   c < VE   C, the incumbents
cannot achieve industry prot maximization if they do not sign an RPM contract with
E. With an industry-wide RPM provision (for E, or for both downstream rms), D must
charge PD = VD, and E must charge pE = vE in both segments. If VE > vE, consumers
from the high-end segments are then willing to buy from E, and E nds it protable to
divert sales from the low-end to the high-end segment whenever C < c.
(ii) If VE  vE, then consumers from the high-end segment are not interested in
buying from E at price pE = vE. The incumbents can then obtain the industry monopoly
prot by charging wE = vE   c, together with an RPM provision requiring E to charge
pE = vE. E is willing to accept this contract and can then only sell to the low-end
segment at that price. Furthermore, under integration, D has no incentive to compete
in the low-end market, as Us upstream margin, wE = vE   c, exceeds Ds downstream
margin, vD   c; similarly, under separation, charging wD = VD   C ensures that D does
not want to sell to the low-end segment (as wD = VD   C > vD   c, which is the largest
margin D could obtain in the low-end segment) and appropriates all of Ds prot.
(iii) Finally, when VE > vE but C  c, charging wE = vE   c achieves industry prot
maximization if E can select its buyers: E is then willing to accept this contract and
to serve the low-end segment at price pE = vE, and is not willing to serve the high-end
segment at that price;9 furthermore, as in case (ii), D has no incentive to compete with
E in the low-end segment under integration, and under separation when wD = VD   C.
As should be clear from the above proof, if VE > vE and C  c, then, in order to
achieve prot maximization with industry-wide RPM, E must be able to ration demand
selectively (namely, to refuse selling to high-end consumers). If instead E could simply
ration demand but not choose its buyers, then under usual rationing schemes some high-
end consumers would end-up buying from E.
The above propositions characterize the conditions under which the incumbents can
obtain the industry monopoly prot. When this is not the case, they may be tempted to
foreclose entry. The following Proposition conrms this possibility; for the sake of expo-
sition, in what follows we focus on the case where rms can selectively ration consumers:
Proposition 4 Suppose that C < c and VE > vE, that RPM is allowed, and that rms
can select which buyers to serve. Regardless of whether non-linear contracts are allowed,
foreclosure then occurs if and only if
x (VE   vE) > (1  x) (vE   vD) :
9In the limit case C = c, E is indi¤erent between serving that segment or not, and is thus willing to
serve only the low-end segment.
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Proof. To characterize the prot that the incumbents can achieve by accommodating
entry, we rst provide a lower bound, and show that it cannot be improved.
Suppose that U o¤ers to supplyE at wholesale price wE = vE c, together with a RPM
provision requiring E to set pE = vE. Under integration, E then wins the competition for
the low-end segment (as the integrated rms upstream margin, wE = vE   c, exceeds its
own downstream margin, vD c); it follows that D wins the competition for the high-end
segment, at price P^D  VD   VE + vE: indeed, D slightly undercuts E in that segment,
as the associated margin, P^D   C = VD   VE + vE   C, exceeds the integrated rms
upstream margin, wE = vE   c.10 Under separation, U can achieve the same outcome
(and appropriate all the prots) by supplying D at wholesale price wD = P^D   C: D
(resp., E) then sells the high-end (resp., low-end) market at price P^D (resp., vE) and
cannot protably serve the other segment. Hence, the resulting prot for the incumbents
is given by:
^ = x(VD   VE + vE   C) + (1  x)(vE   c):
Suppose now that there exists an alternative equilibrium in which the incumbents
accommodate entry and obtain a prot  > ^. This prot must be at least equal to
m, otherwise the incumbents would not accommodate entry; using (1), it must therefore
satisfy:
 > max
n
^; x (VE   C) + (1  x) (vE   c)
o
= x

max
n
P^D; VE
o
  C

+ (1  x) (vE   c) : (3)
Furthermore, as the entrant cannot lose money in equilibrium, the incumbentsprot, ,
cannot exceed the maximal industry prot, and thus:
x (max fPD; VEg   C) + (1  x) (vE   c)  ; (4)
where PD denotes Ds equilibrium price. To see this, note that vE   c is an upper bound
on the margin obtained in the low-end segment, and max fPD; VEg  C an upper bound
on the margin obtained in the high-end segment: either D sells, or E sells at a price that
cannot exceed VE. It follows from (3) and (4) that PD > P^D.
Next, we note that E must be serving (part of) the low-end segment: otherwise,
foreclosure would be more protable. This, in turn, requires pE  vE. High-end consumers
would therefore be willing to buy from E at price pE (as pE  vE and PD > P^D).
Moreover, as C < c, E prefers serving the high-end segment at pE than serving low-end
consumers at the same price. As it can select which buyers to serve, it follows that E
must be serving the entire high-end segment, at some price PE  VE, as well as (part of)
10This amounts to VD   VE + vE   C > vE   c, which follows from VD > VE and C < c.
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the low-end segment. As the margin on the low-end segment cannot exceed vE   c, the
resulting industry prot is thus bounded by:
x (VE   C) + (1  x) (vE   c) :
From (1), this prot is lower than m, a contradiction.
It follows that the incumbentsprot must be equal to ^. Comparing ^ with m
yields the condition in the Proposition.
We conclude with a discussion of the impact of non-linear tari¤s and RPM on con-
sumers and society. Obviously, enlarging the set of instruments available has no impact
when the incumbents achieve the industry monopoly outcome with linear tari¤s, which
is the case if vE   c  VE   C. When instead vE   c < VE   C, allowing non-linear
tari¤s and RPM can only increase the prot derived from accommodating entry, which
enhances total welfare. The impact on consumers is more ambivalent, and depends on
what happens in the benchmark situation (i.e., with linear tari¤s and no RPM):
 When foreclosure occurs, consumers obtain no surplus. In that situation, enlarging
the set of instruments benets consumers if: (i) it induces entry; and (ii) it does
not allow the incumbents to achieve the industry monopoly outcome. This is indeed
the case when VE > vE, C < c, and:
x [(VE   C)  (vE   c)] > (1  x)(vE   vD)  x (VE   vE) :
In that case, allowing (non-linear tari¤s and) RPM induces the incumbent to ac-
commodate entry, and high-end consumers benet from some competition (D serves
them at price P^D < VD).
 When instead entry occurs, consumers obtain some surplus; in that situation, which
arises when
x [(VE   C)  (vE   c)]  (1  x)(vE   vD);
allowing non-linear tari¤s and RPM harms consumers, by allowing the incumbents
to increase the price charged in the high-end segment (namely, from PD = VD  
[(VE   C)  (vE   c)] to either P^D = PD + c  C if c > C and VE > vE, and up to
VD otherwise.
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Online Appendix (Not for Publication)
In this Appendix we show how our analysis can apply to the case of second-degree
price discrimination, where rms cannot explicitly discriminate consumers (e.g., because
they do not identify consumerstypes, or because of a legal ban on such discrimination)
but can o¤er multiple contracts, designed for di¤erent types.
To this end, we modify the baseline model by assuming that high-end consumers must
get at least N > 1 units in order to obtain the utility VD or VE; otherwise, their utility is
zero. The other assumptions remain unchanged: low-end consumers only need one unit
to obtain the utility vD or vE,1 and the costs of serving high-end and low-end consumers
are still C and c, respectively (note that C now denotes the total cost of supplying N
units to a high-end consumer).
To discriminate consumers, each rm i = D;E can o¤er two options: a single unit at
price pi and a bundle of N units at price Pi. For the sake of exposition, we will assume
that low-end consumers cannot unbundlemulti-unit options (high-end consumers may
however satisfy their needs by combining several single-unit options). As a result, if N is
large, namely, if
NvD  VD;
then absent entry the incumbents can still extract all the surplus from consumers (by
charging VD and vD to high-end and low-end consumers, respectively) and obtain:
f = x (VD   C) + (1  x) (vD   c) :
For the sake of exposition, we focus here on the case where the wholesale contract
between U and E simply consists of a linear tari¤, and denote the wholesale price by wE.
Following the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 1, it can be checked that, to
maximize their prot, the incumbents must charge wE = vE   c and induce E to supply
low-end consumers (and only those) at price pE = vE. High-end consumers are then
not tempted to buy from E (at unit price pE = vE), as the above condition NvD  VD
(combined with vE > vD and VD > VE) implies NvE > VE. However, instead of making
zero prot in the low-end segment, E could target high-end consumers by o¤ering them
N units at a price above the associated cost, equal to C+(vE   c)N ; if this cost is lower
than VE and larger than vE,2 then E indeed exerts competitive pressure on D, preventing
it to charge more than
P^D = VD   VE + C + (vE   c)N:
1For exampe, the low-end segment may correspond to households and the high-end segment to busi-
nesses, requiring larger volumes.
2The case C+(vE   c)N < vE does not look plausible and would induce E to sell the N -unit package
at a minimal price P^ = x [C + (vE   c)N ] + (1  x) vE .
1
Summing-up, if VE C > (vE   c)N  vE C, the maximal prot from accommodating
entry is
x [VD   C   (VE   C) + (vE   c)N ] + (1  x)(vE   c):
Comparing this prot with f , foreclosure is optimal if and only if
x ((VE   C)  (vE   c)N) > (1  x)(vE   vD):
We therefore obtain a very similar conclusion as in the baseline model: E still has an
incentive to target the most protable segment, which limits the incumbentsability to
exploit high-end consumers; this may induce the incumbents to foreclose entry.
2
